BEYOND FEAR BRUCE SCHNEIER PDF
Bruce Schneiers ”Beyond Fear” is a book about security in general. books, Schneier explains how security works in the most general case. Beyond Fear. Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World. Bruce Schneier. COPERNICUS BOOKS. An Imprint of Springer-Verlag. [PDF] Download Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World Full version; 2. Book details Author: Bruce Schneier.
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In "e;Beyond Fear,"e; Bruce Schneier invites us to take a critical look at not just the threats to our security, but the ways in which were encouraged to think about . DOWNLOAD PDF Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Schneier, Bruce Beyond fear: thinking sensibly about .. The goal of this book is to demystify security, to help you move beyond fear, and give you the tools to start . In his latest book, Beyond Fear, security expert Bruce Schneier explains how security really works. The key is to think of security not in absolutes, but in terms of.
In Step 2, we determine the risks. In Steps 3 and 4, we look for security solutions that mitigate the risks. In Step 5, we evaluate the trade-offs. Then we try to balance the pros and cons: Is the added security worth the trade-offs? This calculation is risk management, and it tells us what countermeasures are reasonable and what countermeasures are not.
Everyone manages risks differently. It also involves the different perspectives and opinions each of us brings to the world around us. Even if we both have the same knowledge and expertise, what might seem like adequate security to me might be inadequate to you because we have different tolerances for risk.
Because of this fact, security is subjective and will be different for different people, as each one determines his own risk and evaluates the trade-offs for different countermeasures. I once spoke with someone who is old enough to remember when a front-door lock was first installed in her house.
She recalled what an imposition the lock was. All this fuss, just to get into her own home! Security decisions are personal and highly subjective. Maybe countermeasures that I find onerous are perfectly okay with you. Some people are willing to give up privacy and control to live in a gated community, where a guard and, increasingly, a video system takes note of each vehicle entering and exiting. Presumably, the people who live in such communities make a conscious decision to do so, in order to increase their personal security.
For them, a gated community is anathema. But the difference of opinion between the two like the differences between those facing gun-control questions or workplace surveillance options is just that—a valid difference of opinion. A similar debate surrounds genetic engineering of plants and animals. Proponents are quick to explain the various safety and security measures in place and how unlikely it is that bad things can happen. Opponents counter with disaster scenarios that involve genetically engineered species leaking out of the laboratories and wiping out other species, possibly even ours.
Or an alternative argument: For some people in some situations, the level of security is beside the point. The only reasonable defense is not to have the offending object in the first place.
Sometimes perceptions of unacceptable risk are based on morality. People are unwilling to risk certain things, regardless of the possible benefits. We may be unwilling to risk the lives of our children, regardless of any rational analysis to the contrary. For some, the risks of some attacks are unacceptable, as well: Some people are willing to bear any cost to ensure that a similar terrorist attack never occurs again.
For others, the security risks of visiting certain countries, flying on airplanes, or enraging certain individuals are unacceptable. Taken to the extreme, these fears turn into phobias.
The risks can be wildly unlikely, but they are important nonetheless because people act on their perceptions. Even seemingly absolute risk calculations may turn out to be situational. How far can you push the activist who is fearful of a runaway genetic modification?
What would the activist say, for example, if the stakes were different—if a billion people would starve to death without genetically modified foods? This calculation has repeatedly occurred in Africa in recent years, with different countries making different decisions.
But some famine-stricken countries still reject genetically modified flour. Think about the trade-offs made by the people who established the Manhattan Project: Having fission bombs available to the world might be risky, but it was felt that the bombs were less risky than having the Nazis in control of Europe.
These calculations are not easy.
There is always an imprecision, and sometimes the uncertainty factor is very large. It sometimes even involves understanding that a decision will result in some deaths, but that the alternatives are unreasonable.
What is the risk that Al Qaeda will launch a different, but equally deadly, terrorist attack? What is the risk that other terrorist organizations will launch a series of copycat attacks? As difficult as these questions are, it is impossible to intelligently discuss the efficacy of antiterrorism security without at least some estimates of the answers. So people make estimates, or guess, or use their intuition. Most of us have a natural intuition about risk.
Or is it? A restaurant has a reputation to maintain, and is likely to be more careful than a grill cart that disappears at the end of the day. We have our own internal beliefs about the risks of trusting strangers to differing degrees, participating in extreme sports, engaging in unprotected sex, and undergoing elective surgery. High places can be dangerous. Tigers attack. Knives are sharp. A built-in intuition about risk—engendered by the need to survive long enough to reproduce—is a fundamental aspect of being alive.
Every living creature, from bacteria on up, has to deal with risk. Human societies have always had security needs; they are as natural as our needs for food, clothing, and shelter.
In fact, our perceived risks rarely match the actual risks. People often underestimate the risks of some things and overestimate the risks of others. Perceived risks can be wildly divergent from actual risks compiled statistically.
Consider these examples: They worry more about earthquakes than they do about slipping on the bathroom floor, even though the latter kills far more people than the former. Similarly, terrorism causes far more anxiety than common street crime, even though the latter claims many more lives. Many people believe that their children are at risk of being given poisoned candy by strangers at Halloween, even though there has been no documented case of this ever happening.
People have trouble estimating risks for anything not exactly like their normal situation. Americans worry more about the risk of mugging in a foreign city, no matter how much safer it might be than where they live back home. Europeans routinely perceive the U. Men regularly underestimate how risky a situation might be for an unaccompanied woman. The risks of computer crime are generally believed to be greater than they are, because computers are relatively new and the risks are unfamiliar.
People gloss over statistics of automobile deaths, but when the press writes page after page about nine people trapped in a mine—complete with human-interest stories about their lives and families—suddenly everyone starts paying attention to the dangers with which miners have contended for centuries.
Osama bin Laden represents the face of Al Qaeda, and has served as the personification of the terrorist threat. When people voluntarily take a risk, they tend to underestimate it. When they have no choice but to take the risk, they tend to overestimate it. Terrorists are scary because they attack arbitrarily, and from nowhere. Last, people overestimate risks that are being talked about and remain an object of public scrutiny. News, by definition, is about anomalies.
Endless numbers of automobile crashes hardly make news like one airplane crash does. The West Nile virus outbreak in killed very few people, but it worried many more because it was in the news day after day. As a society, we effectively say that the risk of dying in a car crash is worth the benefits of driving around town.
But if those same 40, people died each year in fiery crashes instead of automobile accidents, you can be sure there would be significant changes in the air passenger systems. Similarly, studies have shown that both drivers and passengers in SUVs are more likely to die in accidents than those in compact cars, yet one of the major selling points of SUVs is that the owner feels safer in one.
This example illustrates the problem: People make security decisions based on perceived risks instead of actual risks, and that can result in bad decisions. And the problem is not getting better. Modern society, for all its undeniable advances, has complicated and clouded our ability to assess risk accurately in at least two important ways. The first is the rapid advance of technology. Twenty generations ago, people lived in a society that rarely changed. With a few notable exceptions, the social and economic systems they were born into were the systems in which they and their parents and grandparents spent their entire lives.
Only a privileged few and soldiers and sailors traveled very far from the place of their birth. And changes—someone would invent gunpowder, the stirrup, or a better way of building an arch—were slow to come, and slow to be superseded. People learned how to live their lives, and what they learned was likely to serve them well for an entire lifetime.
What was known and trusted was known and trusted for generations.
Of course the large things about the world— concepts, interactions, institutions—are relatively constant, but a lot of the details about it are in constant flux. This phenomenon is ubiquitous. The average computer user has no idea about the relative risks of giving a credit card number to a Web site, sending an unencrypted e-mail, leaving file sharing enabled, or doing any of the dozens of things he does every day on the Internet.
People can easily read about—in fact, they can hardly avoid reading about—the risks associated with stock manipulation, biological terror weapons, or laws giving police new powers.
But this does not mean that they understand, or are capable of managing, these risks. Technological progress is now faster than our ability to absorb its implications. I am reminded of stories of farmers from the countryside coming to the big city for the first time.
We are all rubes from the past, trying to cope with the present day. And it is this change coming to the farmer, more than the farmer coming to the city, that is the second challenge presented by modern society.
Modern mass media, specifically movies and TV news, has degraded our sense of natural risk. We learn about risks, or we think we are learning, not by directly experiencing the world around us and by seeing what happens to others, but increasingly by getting our view of things through the distorted lens of the media. Rarities and anomalies, like terrorism, are endlessly discussed and debated, while common risks like heart disease, lung cancer, diabetes, and suicide are minimized. If a child is kidnapped in Salt Lake City during the summer, mothers all over the country suddenly worry about the risk to their children.
If there are a few shark attacks in Florida—and a graphic movie—suddenly every swimmer is worried. More people are killed every year by pigs than by sharks, which shows you how good we are at evaluating risk.
This data has been compiled from a variety of sources, and some numbers may be more accurate than others. The point here is not to exactly specify the actual risks, but to illustrate that life is filled with unexpected risks, and that the risks people worry about are rarely the most serious ones.
We are led to believe that problems can be solved in less than two hours, and that the hero can both stop the bad guys and get the girl in the final ten minutes. Movies show technology delivering miracles and lone heroes defeating intricate security systems: James Bond, Mission Impossible, and so on. People believe that the world is far more intricate and devious than it really is. The effects can be seen in courtroom juries, who are more willing to believe a labyrinthine conspiracy theory than a much more likely straightforward explanation.
All this has been true since the beginning of civilization—much narrative is built from heroic stories—but it has never been as pervasive and realistic as today.
The ramifications have profound implications on security. Because we do not understand the risks, we make bad security trade-offs. Moreover, each of these players also has his own agenda, often having nothing to do with security, and some amount of power in relation to the other players. In analyzing any security situation, we need to assess these agendas and power relationships.
It should come as no surprise, then, that there is a strong tendency for a player involved in a security system to approach security subjectively, making those trade-offs based on both his own analysis of the security problem and his own internal and external non-security considerations: Some members of the public are scared to fly each person to his own degree and need to be reassured that everything is going to be okay.
The airlines are desperate to get more of the public flying but are leery of security systems that are expensive or play havoc with their flight schedules.
Many pilots like the idea of carrying guns, as they now fear for their lives. Flight attendants are less happy with the idea, afraid that they could be left in danger while the pilots defend themselves. Elected government officials are concerned about reelection and need to be seen by the public as doing something to improve security.
And the FAA is torn between its friends in the airlines and its friends in government. Confiscating nail files and tweezers from passengers seems like a good idea all around: As a security expert reviewing this imaginary scenario, I am struck by the fact that no one is trying to figure out what the optimal level of risk is, how much cost and inconvenience is acceptable, and then what security countermeasures achieve these trade-offs most efficiently.
Instead, everyone is looking at the security problem from his or her own perspective. And there are many more players, with their own agendas, involved in airline security. Did you ever wonder why tweezers were confiscated at security checkpoints, but matches and cigarette lighters—actual combustible materials—were not?
Because there are power imbalances among the different parties, the eventual security system will work better for some than for others. A security system implies a policy of some sort, which in turn requires someone who defines or has defined it.
In every instance of security, someone—generally the asset owner—gets to define what is an unwarranted action and what is not, and everyone else is obliged to go along with that definition. All security can be—in fact, needs to be—studied in terms of agendas defining policy, with the absolutely inevitable consequence that different players gain and lose as a result.
It takes two players to create a security problem: Policies, then, may be codified into law, but can also involve the unspoken, habitual, traditional, unwritten, and social.
Personal security policies are more driven by societal norms than by law. Self-interest has profound effects on the way a player views a security problem. Except for the inconvenience, credit card fraud is not much of a security problem to the cardholder, because in the U. It might even call into question the value of having a credit card.
Security systems are never value-neutral; they move power in varying degrees to one set of players from another. Pro-privacy technologies give individuals power over their personal information, taking that power away from corporations and governments. In some systems, such as anti-counterfeiting countermeasures, the security system simply works to support a codified power arrangement—that is, one enshrined in law.
Other security systems are open, dynamic, unresolved: Privacy countermeasures like paying for purchases with anonymous cash instead of a credit card have no legal precedents, and instead are part of an ongoing power struggle between people on one side, and corporations and governments on the other. But in both cases, the security systems are part of a greater social system.
Sometimes a policy is straightforward, particularly if it applies to a relatively small and easy-to-define unit. I control the basic security policy of my house. I decide who is allowed in, who gets a key, and when the doors and windows are locked. The credit card system involves many players: All of these players have different security needs and concerns about the system, and the security countermeasures will protect them all to differing degrees.
In this system, the players range from individuals and groups of individuals to institutional players. Some of these institutions are themselves highly complex hierarchies and have significant shared and opposing needs. But even a worldwide credit card operation will have relatively simple needs when compared to national security.
Here the players again range from the individual to the institutional, with complex and varied needs, wants, concerns, hopes, and fears. Securing your home is a much simpler task than securing your nation, partly because in the latter case there are so many different players. Proxies are players who act in the interest of other players.
As society has gotten more complex and technological, individuals have created proxies to take over the task of risk management and to provide them with some level of security. Unfortunately, the proxy is not simply the amalgamation of the will of the people; it is, in and of itself, a new player with an agenda that may not match—in fact will rarely exactly match—the agenda of the person it represents. Most people have no idea how to evaluate the safety of airplanes or prescription drugs.
In these cases and others, the government steps in as a proxy. Through different regulatory agencies—in the U. Most people have no idea about the intricacies of the legal system. Instead of having to navigate them alone, they hire lawyers to act as their proxies. Instead of becoming experts in the subject, they hire commercial plumbers to take care of it for them. This phenomenon has profound effects on security, greater than any individual security technology or countermeasure or system.
Proxies are not necessarily going to make the same risk management decisions that the people they represent would make. This fact determines not only how well security systems are implemented, but also which security systems are even considered.
It determines which power relationship the security serves to enforce, and which players the security measures benefit. And it determines how effectively a security countermeasure will be employed and how often it will be bypassed.
For example, before I bought my home, I hired a building inspector. My real estate agent suggested the building inspector. Conflict of interest inheres in this system. Even though the inspector was theoretically acting in my interests, he needs referrals from the real estate agent more than he needs me. His actual job is to convince me to buy the house.
In my case this turned out not to be a problem, but I have friends who believe that their building inspectors minimized the seriousness of some things and ignored other things— just so the sale would go through.
Conflicts of interest are not, of course, unique to security. Companies do not have the same agenda as their employees, their customers, or even their chief executive or their board of directors.
Inevitably, organizations develop institutional agendas of their own, as do departments within those organizations. While there are different degrees of congruence, proxies—government agencies, courts, insurance companies, and independent testing laboratories—are not identical to the people who turn to them.
In Chapter 1, I wrote that security is partially a state of mind. If this is true, then one of the goals of a security countermeasure is to provide people with a feeling of security in addition to the reality. But some countermeasures provide the feeling of security instead of the reality.
These are nothing more than security theater. In , there was no airline security in the U. After a hijacking in — three men took over a plane and threatened to crash it into the Oak Ridge, Tennessee, nuclear power plant—airlines were required to post armed guards in passenger boarding areas. This countermeasure was less to decrease the risk of hijacking than to decrease the anxiety of passengers. Of course airlines would prefer it if all their flights were perfectly safe, but actual hijackings and bombings are rare events whereas corporate earnings statements come out every quarter.
Beyond Fear Thinking. Sensibly About Security in an UnCertain World
For an airline, for the economy, and for the country, judicious use of security theater calmed fears. Tamper-resistant packaging is also largely a piece of security theater. But product poisonings are very rare, and seals make the buying public feel more secure. Sometimes it seems those in charge—of governments, of companies—need to do something in reaction to a security problem.
Most people are comforted by action, whether good or bad. Instead, they have to rely on the phone companies. Offering security theater can improve market share just as much as offering actual security, and it is significantly cheaper to provide. Comparing this to battery security is another story entirely.
Nokia spends about a hundred times more money per phone on battery security than on communications security. The security system senses when a consumer uses a third-party battery and switches the phone into maximum power-consumption mode; the point is to ensure that consumers buy only Nokia batteries. Nokia is prepared to spend a considerable amount of money solving a security problem that it perceives—it loses revenue if customers buy batteries from someone else—even though that solution is detrimental to consumers.
Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World. pdf download
Nokia is much less willing to make trade-offs for a security problem that consumers have. Other times, a player creates more security than is warranted because of a need for security theater. Were the additional packaging costs worth the minimal increase in security?
I doubt it, but the increase in packaging costs was definitely worth the restored sales due to a reassured consumer base. The market dictated what the manufacturer should spend on increasing the feeling of security, even before any government regulations got into the act.
And while organizations can use it as a cheaper alternative to real security, it can also provide substantial non-security benefits to players.
Beyond fear - thinking sensibly about security in an uncertain world
If you were living in Washington, DC, while the snipers were loose and your daughter was scared to walk home from school, you might have decided to drive her instead. But if driving her home from school made her better able to sleep at night, then buying into a piece of security theater was worth it.
For example: You have an overriding agenda to be able to spend your money and therefore have a powerful vested interest in believing that the money you have is not counterfeit.
When ATM cardholders in the U. In the UK, the reverse was true: The courts generally sided with the banks and assumed that any attempts to repudiate withdrawals were cardholder fraud, and the cardholder had to prove otherwise. The result was that in the U. The airline industry has a long history of fighting improvements in airplane safety. Treaties limit the amount of damages airlines had to pay families of international airplane crash victims, which artificially changed the economics of airplane safety.
It actually made more economic sense for airlines to resist many airplane safety measures, and airplane safety improvements came only after airplane manufacturers received military development contracts and because of new government regulation.
Bureaucracies have their own internal agendas, too. On the other hand, many groups have a cover-your-ass mentality. When the DC area snipers were still at large in , many school districts canceled outdoor events even though the risk of attack was minimal.
Some went so far as to cancel school. Through , the U. That this had little real effect should surprise no one. If the CEO of a major company announced that he was going to reduce corporate earnings by 25 percent to improve security for the good of the nation, he would almost certainly be fired.
Sure, the corporation has to be concerned about national security, but only to the point where its cost is not substantial. Sometimes individual agendas are a harrowing matter of life and death: On 1 September , Korean Airlines Flight , on its way from Anchorage, Alaska, to Seoul, Korea, carrying passengers and crew, strayed off its intended course and entered into Soviet airspace.
His agenda was his own neck. In all of these stories, each player is making security trade-offs based on his own subjective agenda, and often the non-security concerns are the most important ones. What this means is that you have to evaluate security opinions based on the positions of the players.
Tamper-resistant packaging is not worth the expense to that company. Liability laws are not worth the expense to them. When the U. Extra security is worth the civil liberty losses because someone else is going to suffer for it. Security decisions are always about more than security. In economics, what is called an externality occurs when one player makes a decision that affects another player, one not involved in the decision.
In terms of the overall good to society, it is a bad decision to dump toxic waste into the river. Unless you understand the players and their agendas, you will never understand why some security systems take the shape they do. This is the way security works. At the foundation there is a security system protecting assets from attackers. But that security system is based on a policy defined by one or more of the players usually the asset owner and the perceived risks against those assets.
The policy is also affected by other players and other considerations, often having nothing to do with security. The whole process is situational, subjective, and social. Understanding, and working with, these various agendas is often more important than any technical security considerations. The agendas of, and the power relationships between, players are an inevitable part of the process; to think otherwise is to delude yourself.
Understand their different agendas, and learn how to work with them. Understand that the player with the power will get more of his agenda codified into the eventual security system. And remember that security issues will often get trumped by non-security ones.
These interactions affect security in a profound way. They are the points at which the system fails when attacked, and they are the points where the system fails even in the absence of attackers. Because security systems are designed to prevent attack, how the systems fail is critical.
And because attackers are generally rarer than legitimate users, how the systems fail in the absence of attackers is generally more important than how they fail in the presence of attackers. In thinking about security, most people will, sensibly enough, begin by considering specific attacks and defenses. For the vault to be an effective security countermeasure, a lot of other factors must be taken into account. Just for starters, who knows the combination?
What happens if she dies? Who moves money in and out of the vault? When and how? How is the vault secured when the door is open? Who checks to see if the amount of money in the vault is the same as what bank personnel think should be in the vault? How often is this checked?
What happens if there is a discrepancy? Are there safedeposit boxes in the same vault? How do customers get to those boxes? Does it matter to the bank what customers put in their boxes? And who installed the vault? Does the installer know the combination, too? Do some of his employees? Are there alarms on the vault? Who installed the alarm, and who responds when it rings?
Questions, it seems, lead to ever more questions. What happens if, as it did to the Bank of Nova Scotia on 11 September , the bank is buried under stories of collapsed building? No, at least not when it comes to security. The questions proliferate, and inevitably issues surrounding what at first seems little more than a big heavy box with a lock branch out to questions of personnel, and rules of access, and a myriad of other considerations.
As some engineers say, the issues ramify. Faced with even a fairly routine security problem—how to protect the money in a bank—a security planner immediately has to deal not just with the what, but with the who and with the how—and all their interactions. Often security is less concerned about the assets being protected, and more about the functionality of those assets. What matters is the opening and closing of the safe, the taking money in and out, the installation, et cetera.
To put it another way, adding security to anything requires a system, and systems are complex and elusive and potentially maddening beasts. But if you want to understand security, there is no escaping them.
You are forced to think in terms of systems. At the most basic level, a system is a collection of simpler components that interact to form a greater whole.
A machine is a simple thing, even though it may have different pieces. A hammer is a machine; a table saw is a system. A pulley is a machine; an elevator is a system. A tomahawk is a machine; a Tomahawk cruise missile is a complex system. And it gets even more complicated. Systems interact with other systems, forming ever-larger systems. A cruise missile is made up of many smaller systems. It interacts with launching systems and ground-control systems, which in turn interact with targeting systems and other military systems and even political systems.
Systems mark the difference between a shack and a modern building, a guard dog and a centralized alarm system, a landing strip and an airport. Anyone can build a stop sign—or even a traffic light—but it takes a different mind-set entirely to conceive of a citywide traffic control system.
After that, we had systems. The word system is also used to describe complex social, political, and economic processes—more specifically, collections of interacting processes. Going to a doctor is a process; health care is a system.
Sitting down to dinner with your children is a process; a family is a system. Deciding how you live your own life is a process; deciding how other citizens live their lives is a political system. The commercial air transport system is a collection of smaller physical systems—airplanes, airports, a labor force—and smaller abstract systems like air traffic control and ticketing. Even though the notion of a system is a modern invention, we can look back through history and find systems in all sorts of social arrangements: Four walls and a roof make a hut.
As such, it shares the traits of other systems. Take the bank vault example that opened this chapter. When a bank installs a vault, it also institutes systems of operation, auditing, and disaster recovery, to name a few. The vault is inextricably bound to these other systems. The security system is in itself a collection of assets plus functionality, and it affects the functionality of the very assets that are being protected.
These interactions are called emergent properties of systems. Another, and somewhat more loaded, term currently in favor is unintended consequences. Everyone predicted that the automobile would result in people traveling farther and faster, but the modern suburb was an emergent property. Emergent properties regularly affect security systems. Early banks had vaults with simple locks, either key or combination. Another was to start shooting his co-workers, one by one.
This is one reason modern bank vaults have time locks; managers simply cannot open the lock, even under duress, so threatening them and their families has no purpose. In fact, in some ways all security breaches are a result of emergent properties. Locks are supposed to keep people without keys out; lock picking is an emergent property of the system. Even though these properties are at first glance undesirable, their discovery and exploitation by attackers are often the first inkling that the countermeasure is fallible.
Security is not a function that can be tested—like a chemical reaction or a manufacturing process. An insecure system can exist for years before anyone notices its insecurity. It might mean simply that no one has ever tried to break in, or it might mean that dozens have tried to break in and, without your ever knowing about it, given up in failure.
Both of these situations look exactly the same. Because so often a successful security system looks as if nothing ever happens, the only reliable way to measure security is to examine how it fails—in the context of the assets and functionality it is protecting. Most systems—cars, telephones, government bureaucracies— are useful for what they do. Most engineering involves making systems work.
I care about how it reacts when it fails. And I care about how it can be made to fail. Hollywood likes to portray stagecoach robberies as dramatic acts of derring-do: The robbers gallop alongside the fleeing horses and jump onto the careening coach. All the robbers had to do was find a steep hill and wait. When the defensive systems—staying inside the coach, being able to gallop away—failed, the robbers attacked. Sometimes systems fail in surprising ways.
In , some enterprising criminals installed a fake ATM at a shopping mall in Manchester, Connecticut. It was programmed to collect the account number from the card and the PIN as it was typed. Safety and reliability engineers also go to great lengths to ensure performance in the face of failure, but there is an important difference between what they do and what security engineers do. Security systems need to work under such random circumstances, but they also have to give special consideration to nonrandom events; that is, to the presence of an intelligent and malicious adversary who forces faults at precisely the most opportune time and in precisely the most opportune way.
Whatever your trade and whatever your background, go ahead and read it This is possibly the most important question of this decade, and that makes Schneier's book one of the most important texts of the decade. This should be required reading for every American Spinellis Computing Reviews V.
If you read the newspapers or listen to the pundits you might answer "yes" to these questions, but the truth will surprise you. Security expert Bruce Schneier has spent his entire career figuring out how security actually works, and he explains it all in this entertaining and readable book. Beyond Fear goes beyond the hype, and explains how we all can think sensibly about security.
In today's uncertain world, security is too important to be left to others. Drawing from his experience advising world business and political leaders, Schneier demonstrates the practical—and surprisingly simple—steps we can all take to address the real threats faced by our families, our communities, and our nation. Security is not mysterious, Bruce Schneier tells us, and contrary to popular belief, it is not hard.
He tells us why security is much more than cameras, guards, and photo IDs, and why expensive gadgets and technological cure-alls often obscure the real security issues. Using anecdotes from history, science, sports, movies, and the evening news, Beyond Fear explains basic rules of thought and action that anyone can understand and, most important of all, anyone can use.
The benefits of Schneier's non-alarmist, common-sense approach to analyzing security will be immediate. You'll have more confidence about the security decisions you make, and new insights into security decisions that others make on your behalf.
Whether your goal is to enhance security at home, at the office, and on the road, or to participate more knowledgeably and confidently in the current debates about security in our communities and the nation at large, this book will change the way you think about security for the rest of your life. Schneier on Security is a personal website. Opinions expressed are not necessarily those of IBM Security.
About Bruce Schneier I am a public-interest technologist , working at the intersection of security, technology, and people.Schneier believes we all can and should be better security consumers, and that the trade-offs we make in the name of security - in terms of cash outlays, taxes, inconvenience, and diminished freedoms - should be part of an ongoing negotiation in our personal, professional, and civic lives, and the subject of an open and informed national discussion.
These five steps may seem obvious when stated in this abstract form, but applying them to real situations is hard work. He tells us why security is much more than cameras, guards, and photo IDs, and why expensive gadgets and technological cure-alls often obscure the real security issues.
Here we consider the need for security. About the authors Bruce Schneier is the author of seven books, including Applied Cryptography which Wired called "the one book the National Security Agency wanted never to be published" and Secrets and Lies, described in Fortune as a "startlingly lively jewel box of little surprises you can actually use. It should come as no surprise, then, that there is a strong tendency for a player involved in a security system to approach security subjectively, making those trade-offs based on both his own analysis of the security problem and his own internal and external non-security considerations:
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